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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Idaho Legislature adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreements Act (UPAA).' The Act was adopted with a minimum of
fanfare and little public comment.2 Given the paucity of case law
dealing with premarital agreements in Idaho,3 the Act fills a niche
that needed filling. In addition, the Act provides a more protective
* PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO COLLEGE OF LAW. B.A., THE
COLLEGE OF WOOSTER, 1979; J.D., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, 1982.
1. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS AcT, 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987) [hereinafter
UPAA] (codified in Idaho at IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921 to -929 (1996)).
2. Minutes, Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee, S. 1083, 53d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1995). The only testimony was from Rex Blackburn, Commission-
er, Idaho Commission on Uniform State Law. Id.
3. See infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
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approach to enforcement of remarital agreements than that estab-
lished by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Liebelt v. Liebelt.' Finally,
the UPAA establishes an arguably lower standard of disclosure for
the enforcement of premarital agreements than is established by
Idaho case law on post-marital agreements.5
In this article, I will discuss the provisions of the UPAA, attempt
to place the UPAA in the larger context of judicial treatment of pre-
marital agreements and discuss the criticisms of the Act. I will then
discuss the pre-UPAA law in Idaho and show how the UPAA fills the
gaps in that law and how it possibly alters the approach previously
taken by the Idaho courts.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIFORM ACT
A. In General
The Uniform Premarital Agreements Act (UPAA) was proposed
by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws (NCUSL) in 1983
and has since been adopted by twenty-five states." The UPAA, pre-
sented by its drafters as a codification of basic common law princi-
ples, was slow to catch on but has been easily adopted in an increas-
ing number of jurisdictions.7 The information packet put together by
NCUSL, and provided to state legislators with the Act, states that
4. 118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1990). See infra notes 87-108 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Liebelt decision.
5. See infra notes 109-121 and accompanying text.
6. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTs ACT, 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987 & Supp.
1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-201 to -205 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-17 (West 1994);
1995 Conn. Acts 95-170 §§ 1-11 (Reg. [Spec.] Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 321-328 (Supp. 1996); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572D-1 to -11 (Michie 1997);
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921 to -929 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 10/1 to 10/11
(West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-2.5-1 to -10 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 596.1 to .12 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-801 to -811 (1995);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 141-151 (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-2-601 to -610 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-1001 to -1011 (Supp. 1996); NEV.
REV. STAT ANN. §§ 123A.010 to .100 (Michie 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -
41 (West Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1 to -10 (Michie Supp. 1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to -11 (1987 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
03.1-01 to -09 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 108.700 to 1740 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 15-17-1 to -11 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 25-2-16 to -25 (Michie 1992); TEX.
FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 5.41 to .56 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-8-1 to -9
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (Michie 1995).
7. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 127 n.4 (1993). The UPAA
was adopted in Idaho with virtually no debate or public input. See supra note 2
and accompanying text.
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the UPAA "makes no radical departure from the developing common
law; indeed, it incorporates the best principles of existing state laws
on premarital agreements."8
The drafters of the UPAA sought to propose a statute that would
ensure greater enforceability of premarital agreements.9 From this
perspective, section 6 of the Act is the key provision.0 That section
provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party
challenging the agreement proves either that she or he did not exe-
cute the agreement voluntarily" or, that the agreement was uncon-
scionable when executed.12 To prove unconscionability, section 6 pro-
vides that the challenging party must establish that she or he was
not provided full and fair disclosure of the other party's property and
financial information," did not waive disclosure,' or did not know
or reasonably could not have known of the other party's property or
financial information. 5
Despite the representations of its drafters, the UPAA goes be-
yond merely codifying existing common law principles. At the time
the UPAA was drafted, the law regarding enforcement of premarital
agreements was rather young 6 and no coherent framework had
8. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, Why All States Need the Uniform Premar-
ital Agreement Act, in UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT - INFORMATION
PACKET (1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter UPAA INFORMATION PACKET]. See
also Atwood, supra note 7, at 127 (quoting an apparently identical document iden-
tified as UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS, Why All States Need the Uniform Premar-
ital Agreement Act, in UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT - INFORMATION
PACKET (1990) (on file with Atwood)).
9. UPAA INFORMATION PACKET, supra note 8. See also Atwood, supra note
7, at 142.
10. The UPAA also contains, among others, provisions regulating the formal-
ities, content, amendment, and revocation of premarital agreements. See UPAA, su-
pra note 1, §§ 2, 3, 5, at 372-75. For in-depth discussions of these provisions, see
Laura P. Graham, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Poli-
cy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037 (1993); Faith H. Spencer, Expanding Marital Op-
tions: Enforcement of Premarital Contracts During Marriage, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 281.
11. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a), at 376.
12. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b), at 376.
13. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b)(i), at 376.
14. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b)(ii), at 376.
15. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b)(iii), at 376.
16. In an important article, Judith Younger briefly traces the judicial rec-
ognition of premarital agreements to 16th century England. Judith T. Younger,
Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1988)
[hereinafter Younger]. See also Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The
Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 147, 147-
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emerged from the state court treatment of these agreements." In
fact, at about the same time that the UPAA was proposed, NCUSL
also proposed the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA) is which es-
tablished a somewhat different standard for the enforcement of pre-
marital agreements than the UPAA.19 In particular, although pre-
marital agreements regulating property rights at the death of one of
the spouses has long been a part of the marital landscape, such
agreements were not generally recognized as effective to allocate
property rights between the spouses at divorce until the 1970s.2"
Thus, the phenomenon of one spouse asserting rights under the
agreement against the other spouse as part of a divorce action was,
at the time the UPAA was drafted, a somewhat new and growing
phenomenon.21
48 (1996). Most commentators seem to agree, however, that, driven by higher di-
vorce rates and some key cases in the early 1970s, premarital agreements have
enjoyed a resurgence. See Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender
Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 264-65 (1994). Many believe the use and
enforcement of premarital agreements continues to increase. See Brod, supra, at
232; Pamela George, Can A Woman of the 90's Have it All? Or, Is She Once Again
Faced With the Age Old Question - "What's A Girl To Do"?, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MAT-
RIM. LAW. 73, 74 (1992); Guggenheimer, supra, at 151.
17. A survey of law review articles discussing the enforcement of premarital
agreements published around the time the UPAA was proposed illustrates the
diversity of opinion and approach to these types of contracts. See, e.g., J. Thomas
Oldham, Premarital Contracts are Enforceable Unless .... 21 HOUS. L. REV. 757,
759 (1984) ("A uniform standard for the enforceability of such contracts has yet to
evolve; some states grant spouses substantial freedom to contract, while others
impose strict procedural requirements and public policy limits.") (footnote omitted);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204 (1982) (advocating the adoption of a coherent frame-
work for the enforcement of marriage contracts because none existed at the time);
Pamela M. Donna, Note, Antenuptial Agreements Governing Alimony or Property
Rights Upon Divorce: Osborne v. Osborne, 24 B.C. L. REV. 469 (1983) (noting,
throughout, the disparate treatment of antenuptial agreements from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction); Stephen P. Stanczak, Note, For Better or For Worse . . . But Just in
Case, Are Antenuptial Agreements Enforceable, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 531, 531, 544
(noting the "non-uniform treatment of agreements which purport to perform the
same function" and noting a trend toward the enforcement of agreements that "do
not work an undue hardship on either of the parties").
18. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1996) [hereinafter UMPA].
19. The UMPA provides that the spouses shall exercise good faith towards
each other and that the duty of good faith may not be altered by agreement.
UMPA, supra note 18, at § 2.
20. See generally Homer H. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 141 (1979) (reviewing the requirements for enforcement of premarital con-
tracts).
21. Interestingly enough, the drafters of the UPAA themselves recognized the
uncertainty in the emerging law of premarital agreements in the states. Thus,
[Vol. 33
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At the time the UPAA was drafted, most jurisdictions were just
beginning to sort out the "second generation" issues created by their
relatively recent recognition of the enforceability of such arrange-
ments. The drafters of the UPAA sorted through this developing state
law and, from it, adopted a view of such agreements that certainly
was within the mainstream of the developing law, but that avowedly
emphasized freedom of contract over protection of the economically
un-empowered spouse.' It was not at all clear at the time the
UPAA was drafted that the freedom of contract view would emerge
as the predominant view if states were left to sort out the enforce-
ment issues without the help of a uniform act. In fact, a number of
state courts have rejected the freedom of contract view adopted by
the UPAA drafters.' Even some of the states that have adopted the
UPAA have softened some of its most criticized provisions.2" The
criticism of the UPAA has centered on several policy decisions made
by its drafters relating to the burden of proof in actions challenging
the Act, and to the contours of the Act's provisions regarding uncon-
scionability.'
while stating that the proposed act "makes no radical departure from developing
common law," the drafters also argued that the law of premarital contracts "re-
mains confusing, vague and varies from state to state." UPAA INFORMATION PACK-
ET, supra note 8, at Why All States Need the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
22. The freedom of contract approach adopted by the UPAA drafters appar-
ently was driven by their desire for certainty and uniformity in the enforcement of
properly executed agreement: "[Wlith the increasing awareness among prospective
marital partners of the need to settle issues of property and income between them-
selves before marriage, the need for adequate, valid premarital agreements grows."
UPAA INFORMATION PACKET, supra note 8, at Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
23. See infra notes 31, 50, 52, 57 and accompanying text.
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (1991) (adding a section providing that
"[n]otwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, if a court finds that the
enforcement of a premarital agreement would be clearly unconscionable, the court
may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement with-
out the unconscionable provisions, or limit the application of an unconscionable
provision to avoid an unconscionable result."). Iowa, Nevada, and New Jersey made
financial disclosure an independent requirement for validity of premarital agree-
ments under their versions of the UPAA. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.7 (West
1996); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.010 to .100 (Michie 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
37:2-31 to :2-41 (West Supp. 1996). See also Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445, 449 (Nev.
1993) (discussing Nevada's version of the UPAA and pointing out Nevada's unique
approach that non-disclosure is an independent basis for invalidating a premarital
agreement). California, Iowa, and South Dakota did not adopt section 3(a)(4) of the
UPAA permitting the modification or elimination of spousal support as an appro-
priate subject for a premarital agreement. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West
1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.5 (West 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-18
(Michie 1992). Arkansas permits waivers of the requirements of the UPAA only
after consulting an attorney. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-406 (Michie 1993).
25. See ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUISE I. PARLY, 3 LINDEY ON SEPARATION
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The criticism of the Act, however, must be viewed in a larger
context. At the time the UPAA was drafted some jurisdictions had
not (and today still have not) adequately dealt with the questions of
enforcement of premarital agreements.' A few jurisdictions have
adopted a view of such agreements that is even less protective of the
un-empowered spouse than the UPAA.27 Thus, adoption of the
UPAA has provided a needed structure and context in which such
agreements can be enforced or struck down. Moreover, most of the
Act's critics have focused on its provisions regarding burden of proof,
unconscionability and disclosure, to the exclusion of the provision
requiring voluntariness." By overlooking the voluntariness require-
ment, these commentators have concluded that the Act departs more
dramatically from pre-UPAA authority than it actually does.
B. Burden of Proof
The first contentious provision of section 6 is its imposition of
the burden of proof on the party challenging the agreement in all
situations.29 While pre-UPAA and non-UPAA courts generally placed
the burden of proof on the challenging party, courts sometimes effec-
tuated a shift of the burden under certain circumstances." In a
number of cases, such courts have taken the position that if the pre-
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90.12, at 90-106 (1991); Atwood,
supra note 7, at 142-52; Brod, supra note 16, at 275-82; Ronald S. Ladden & Rob-
ert J. Franco, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: An Ill-Reasoned Retreat
From the Unconscionability Analysis, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 267 (1990); Judith T. Youn-
ger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An Update, 8 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 1, 40 (1992) [hereinafter Younger, Update].
26. See supra note 17 for the commentators' discussions of the law of pre-
marital agreements around 1983 when the UPAA was adopted. The discussion of
Idaho law, infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text, indicates that to date, the
law in Idaho has not developed with any level of clarity in this area.
27. E.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (arguably the court
rejected a review of substantive fairness of the agreement altogether). See Atwood,
supra note 7, at 140-41 for a discussion of the Simeone case. See also Lemaster v.
Dutton, No. 2950324, 1996 WL 661730, at *25 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 15, 1996) (ap-
plying the Alabama rule that an agreement is enforceable if "the party against
whom the agreement is being enforced [has] ... general knowledge, not a full
knowledge, of the other's estate").
28.. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 7, at 143 (omitting completely a discussion
of the voluntariness requirement); Ladden & Franco, supra note 25, at 272-73 (also
focusing exclusively on unconscionability); Younger, Update, supra note 25, at 40
(noting the voluntariness requirement of the UPAA but not discussing it).
29. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a), at 376. See, e.g., LINLEY & PARLY, supra
note 25, at § 90.12.
30. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 16, at 262-63.
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marital agreement makes no provision or a disproportionately small
provision for the economically un-empowered spouse, a presumption
of overreaching arises. Once this happens, the burden of proof then
shifts to the proponent of the agreement to establish that the execu-
tion of the agreement by the un-empowered spouse was voluntary
and based on a full understanding of that spouse's property rights
and the nature and extent of the property.31 The UPAA contains no
similar provision for shifting the burden of proof, thus making it
arguably more difficult to attack the validity of a premarital agree-
ment.32
31. See Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271, 273-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
("Once the claiming spouse establishes that the agreement is unreasonable, a pre-
sumption arises that there was either concealment by the defending spouse or a
presumed lack of knowledge by the challenging spouse of the defending spouse's
finances at the time the agreement was reached. The burden then shifts to the
defending spouse, who may rebut these presumptions by showing that there was
either (a) a full, frank disclosure to the challenging spouse by the defending
spouse before the signing of the agreement relative to the value of all the marital
property and the income of the parties, or (b) a general and approximate knowl-
edge by the challenging spouse of the character and extent of the marital property
sufficient to obtain a value by reasonable means, as well as a general knowledge
of the income of the parties."); Matuga v. Matuga, 600 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988) (reasoning that while the burden of proof is generally on the party
challenging the agreement, "[wihen, however, the [proponent of the agreement] has
a degree of dominance, that party may be required to demonstrate that the agree-
ment is valid, but only if the dominance and its employment has vitiated the free
will of the party challenging the agreement and even then, only if the party de-
fending the agreement has obtained a substantial and unconscionable advantage.");
McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn. 1989) ("Under the com-
mon law, the proponent of the agreement had the burden of demonstrating the
procedural fairness of the agreement at its inception. Because we hold that Minn.
Stat. § 519.11 did not alter common law rules of procedural or substantive fairness
applicable to provisions relating to the allocation of marital property, [the propo-
nent of the agreement] has the burden of establishing the fairness of the con-
tract-both procedurally and substantively."); Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d
781, 784 (Nev. 1992) ("Because of the presumed fiduciary relationship existing be-
tween parties who are engaged to be married, a presumption of fraud has been
found where the agreement entered into greatly disfavors one of the parties. This
presumption may be overcome by a showing that the party claiming disadvantage
was not in fact disadvantaged.") (citations omitted); Randolph v. Randolph, 937
S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tenn. 1996) ("As we interpret the knowledge element of the
[Tennessee] statute, the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of
the nature, extent, and value of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse
seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the
spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full
nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse's holdings.").




The UPAA requirement of voluntariness33 appears to be com-
pletely consistent with the vast majority of non-UPAA requirements
for premarital agreements. In addition, the requirement of the UPAA
appears to overlap to some extent with the non-UPAA approach to
procedural unconscionability. The UPAA's voluntariness requirement
proscribes agreements procured by fraud3  and duress. 35 In addi-
tion, the voluntariness provision proscribes conduct leading to the
execution of premarital agreements that does not rise to the level of
fraud or duress. By using the term "voluntary" in section 6 rather
than expressly limiting the Act to fraud and duress, the drafters of
the UPAA contemplated that conduct short of fraud or duress would
be relevant to the voluntariness of an agreement.3 '
The comments to section 6 support a broad interpretation of the
voluntariness requirement. After summarizing the general standards
for enforceability of premarital agreements, the comments to section
6 state that "[iun each of these situations, it should be underscored
that execution must have been voluntary."37 In support of this state-
ment, the drafters of the UPAA cited Lutgert v. Lutgert3s and the
provisions of the Delaware Code on premarital agreements requiring
a ten day waiting period.39 Lutgert involved a situation in which the
Uniform Premarital Agreements Act has altered these tests by placing the burden
solely on the opponent of the agreement with no shift being made for an agree-
ment being 'unfair on its face.'") (citations omitted).
33. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a), at 376.
34. Lewis Becker, Premarital Agreements: An Overview, in PREMARITAL AND
MARITAL CONTRACTS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING ENFORCE-
ABLE MARITAL AND COHABITATION AGREEMENTS 1, 8 (Edward L. Winer et al. eds.,
1993) (citing fraud as "one of the clearest examples of involuntary assent").
35. Id. at 11 (arguing that "the concept of duress [in the premarital agree-
ment context) ... seems to blend often indistinguishably into a discussion of
voluntariness").
36. Professor Becker points out that the requirement of "voluntariness" in
the execution of a premarital agreement was often imposed by courts in -the pre-
UPAA case law. Becker, supra note 34, at 10. See also Younger, Update, supra
note 25, at 19-20 ("The inquiry into voluntariness begins as a common law review
for fraud, overreaching, or sharp dealing but probes deeper than the similar inqui-
ry made in cases of ordinary contracts. Some factors involved in this assessment
are the parties' respective experience in worldly affairs, . . . the timing of the
signing of the agreement in relation to the time of the wedding and the parties'
representation by independent counsel.") (footnotes omitted).
37. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6 cmt., at 376.
38. 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 301 (repealed 1996). This section provided in
relevant part:
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husband "sprung" the premarital agreement on the wife hours before
the wedding while they were having their wedding rings sized and
after all plans for the wedding had been completed. When the wife
expressed reluctance to sign the agreement, the husband told her no
agreement, no wedding."0 The wife spoke only to the husband's law-
yers before signing the agreement one-half hour before the ceremony.
The court, holding the agreement invalid because the wife's assent
was not voluntarily given, stated:
Surely, particularly at the last moment, a prospective wife
ought not be forced into a position of being 'bought' at the
price of losing all if she does not agree to a grossly dispropor-
tionate benefit to the husband should she leave him under
any and all circumstances ....4'
The drafters' citation to Lutgert and to the procedural protections of
the Delaware Code certainly indicate their intent that the
voluntariness provisions of the UPAA be read broadly.
Prior to the UPAA, courts used the rubric of voluntariness to
include a myriad of factors such as timing,"2 knowledge of underly-
ing legal rights,'3 knowledge and understanding of the terms of the
A man and a woman in contemplation of matrimony, by a mar-
riage contract executed in the presence of 2 witnesses at least 10
days before the solemnization of the marriage, may determine what
rights each shall have in the other's estate during marriage and
after its dissolution by death and may bar each other of all rights
in their respective estates not so secured to them, and any such
contract duly acknowledged before any officer authorized to take
acknowledgements [sic] may be recorded in the deed records in the
office of the recorder in any and all counties of the State.
Id. This provision was repealed when Delaware adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreements Act in 1996. 70 Del. Laws 462 (1996).
40. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1114.
41. Id. at 1116.
42. Becker notes that "the more time the spouse had, the more likely the
agreement is to be upheld." Becker, supra note 34, at 10. Compare In re Marriage
of-Matson, 730 P.2d 668, 672-73 (Wash. 1986) (affirming court of appeals' decision
based in part on the timing of the agreement's execution, finding that "the timing
of the agreement negated any inclination respondent may have had to secure inde-
pendent advice." The wife was presented with the agreement for the first time
four days before the marriage and was required to sign it on the evening before
the wedding.) with.Taylor v. Taylor, 832 P.2d 429, 431 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (wife
had agreement for three months prior to signing it). But see DeLorean v.
DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Cl. Div. 1986) (upholding an agreement
signed just hours before the wedding because the wife had the opportunity to
consult with an attorney who advised her not to sign the agreement).
43. See, e.g., Orgler v. Orgler, 568 A.2d 67, 70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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agreement," and availability of independent legal advice' to de-
termine the voluntariness of any particular agreement. As Judith
Younger, in the second of her important articles on premarital
agreements describes it, "[tihe inquiry into voluntariness begins as a
common law review for fraud, overreaching, or sharp dealing."'6
D. Unconscionability
In addition to requiring voluntariness, the UPAA imposes a
requirement that premarital agreements not be unconscionable. 7
The comments to section 6 of the UPAA suggest that the standard of
unconscionability is the same standard as that found in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act provisions regarding the enforceability of
separation agreements 8 or the standard of commercial unconsciona-
bility." Many commentators have argued that the motivation of the
UPAA drafters to enhance the enforceability of premarital
agreements led them to adopt a less protective approach to uncon-
scionability than was emerging in state courts at the time.'
1989) (striking down agreement in part because wife did not understand concepts
of equitable division and alimony).
44. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1992)
(striking down the agreement because "it was not explained to [the wife] that, by
virtue of the contract, [the husband's] already substantial wealth could be in-
creased at the expense of the marital community").
45. Younger, while noting that no state requires independent advice of coun-
sel as a requirement for validity, describes the existence of independent advice of
counsel as "the best evidence that a party made an agreement voluntarily." Youn-
ger, Update, supra note 25, at 20. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d
208, 214 (Wash. 1972) (striking down an agreement, in part, because the wife did
not have independent advice prior to signing the agreement).
46. Younger, Update, supra note 25, at 19-20.
47. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b), at 376.
48. See UPAA, supra note 1, § 6 cmt., at 376 (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216-17 (1987) [hereinafter UMDA]). Interestingly
enough, a number of commentators have pointed out that a party can more easily
escape the binding effect of a separation agreement under the UMDA than a pre-
marital agreement under the UPAA; under the UMDA a separation agreement
regarding spousal maintenance is not binding if a court finds it "unconscionable."-
UMDA, supra § 306, at 216.
49. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6 cmt, at 377 ("The standard of unconscionability
is used in commercial law, where its meaning includes protection against one-sid-
edness, oppression, or unfair surprise . . . . Hence the act does not introduce a
novel standard unknown to the law.") (citations omitted) (quoting the Com-
missioner's note to UMDA, supra note 48, at 217).
50. See Atwood, supra note 7, at 128-29; Younger, Update, supra note 25, at
42-43; Ladden & Franco, supra note 25, at 272-73. Feminist writers have also
criticized the UPAA as departing from the common law of many states in a way
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The UPAA drafters opted to evaluate unconscionability at the
time the agreement is executed.5 In doing so, however, they devi-
ated from the approach of jurisdictions which evaluated the uncon-
scionability of an agreement at the time of enforcement.52 In addi-
tion, the UPAA provisions regarding disclosure open the door for
that is disproportionately hard on women. See generally Brod, supra note 16. See
also George, supra note 16, at 82; Guggenheimer, supra note 16, at 153-54.
51. UPAA section 6(a)(2) provides that the agreement can be set aside if it
"was unconscionable when it was executed" among other requirements. UPAA,
supra note 1, § 6(a)(2), at 376. UPAA section 6(b) does permit the court to evalu-
ate the fairness of an agreement's provisions for spousal support at the time the
agreement is enforced if the agreement's provisions for or bar on spousal support
will cause one of the spouses to become dependent on public assistance. UPAA,
supra note 1, § 6(b), at 376.
52. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734-35 (Colo. 1982) ("One
of the purposes of the [Uniform Dissolution of Marriage] Act is to mitigate poten-
tial harm to a spouse caused by the dissolution of marriage. This purpose mili-
tates against the strict enforcement of an antenuptial provision for maintenance
which, while drafted with meticulous care and utmost good faith and perfectly
reasonable at the time of the execution of the agreement, has since become uncon-
scionable in terms of its application to the spouse at the time of the marriage
dissolution. The policy to mitigate against potential harm is consistent with the
legitimate governmental interest of the state generally to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens. It is not unrealistic to recognize that the health and em-
ployability of the spouse may have so deteriorated during a marriage that to en-
force the maintenance provisions of an antenuptial agreement would result in the
spouse becoming a public charge. Thus, we do not subscribe to the view that the
antenuptial agreement, even though entered into in accordance with the strict tests
heretofore alluded to, is strictly enforceable regardless of intervening events which
have rendered it in effect unconscionable."); Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d 1265,
1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a court may consider circumstances at the
time of dissolution in determining unconscionability); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d
500, 509 (Ohio 1984) ("One who, by way of a motion for modification, claims the
unconscionability of a provision for maintenance within an antenuptial agreement
has the burden of showing the unconscionable effect of the provision at the time of
divorce or dissolution."); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985)
("[Pirenuptial agreements will be enforced in their explicit terms only to the extent
that circumstances at the time the marriage ends are roughly what the parties
foresaw at the time they entered into the prenuptial agreement. In this regard the
passage, of time, a change of position based upon reasonable reliance on the per-
manence of the marriage, and the birth of children are relevant factors, among
others, for a court to consider."); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis.
1982) ("Clearly an agreement fair at execution is not unfair at divorce just because
the application of the agreement at divorce results in a property division which is
not equal between the parties or which a court might not order under [the equita-
ble distribution statute]. If, however, there are significantly changed circumstances
after the execution of an agreement and the agreement as applied at divorce no
longer comports with the reasonable expectations of the parties, an agreement
which is fair at execution may be unfair to the parties at divorce.").
549
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premarital agreements to be enforced without requiring disclosure in
all circumstances, an approach that varies from some non-UPAA
courts.53 By permitting a spouse to waive disclosure,54 and by per-
mitting enforcement of a premarital agreement without disclosure
where the spouse knew or reasonably could have known of the finan-
cial situation of the other spouse55 the Act broadens the possibility
of enforcement by weakening the standard of unconscionability.
A number of courts have taken the approach adopted by the
UPAA regarding the "knew or could have known" standard. 6 In con-
trast to the UPAA, however, many courts have concluded that a pre-
marital agreement is unenforceable without disclosure unless the
spouse had actual, independent knowledge of the other party's finan-
cial situation.57
53. See Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445, 449 (Nev. 1993) (interpreting Nevada's
unique version of the UPAA, see supra note 24, and prior Nevada case law requir-
ing disclosure as making disclosure an independent requirement for enforcement of
a premarital agreement).
54. UPAA section 6(a)(2)(ii) permits voluntary, express, written waivers of
disclosure. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a)(2)(ii), at 376.
55. Id. The UPAA's language regarding knowledge - "did not have, or rea-
sonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge" of the other spouse's finances
- is curious. Id. (emphasis added). The use of the term "could" implies that if the
spouse could have discovered the other's finances, he or she has some implied
obligation to inquire, regardless of whether a reasonable spouse would have done
SO.
56. See Ex parte Walters, 580 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1991) (finding that be-
cause the spouses had lived together for six months prior to marriage, the one
spouse had an adequate general knowledge of the other's property); In re Matter of
Ascherl, 445 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the challenging
spouse had visited other spouse's property and reasonably should have known its
value); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Il. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that
because the wife worked for husband's company, she thus acquired knowledge of
his property); In re Marriage of Adams, 729 P.2d 1151, 1156 (Kan. 1986) (uphold-
ing an agreement, in part, because the wife was a real estate agent who had the
opportunity to visit the husband's property, had a long time friendship with the
husband prior to the marriage and had significant family connections to the
defendant's business).
57. See, e.g., Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding that the proponent of the agreement must establish that the other spouse
had "a general and approximate knowledge by the challenging spouse of the char-
acter and extent of the marital property sufficient to obtain a value by reasonable
means, as well as a general knowledge of the income of the parties. The test in
this regard is the adequacy of the challenging spodse's knowledge at the time of
the agreement and whether the challenging spouse is prejudiced by the lack of
information.") (citations omitted); Hartz v. Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 871 (Md. 1967) ("If
there is neither proper disclosure nor actual knowledge and the allowance made to
the one who waives is unfairly disproportionate to the worth of the property in-
volved at the time the agreement is made, the burden is cast upon the one who
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The UPAA's provision permitting express written waivers of
disclosure" is the broadest practical exception to the disclosure re-
quirements that had been emerging in many state courts. Prior to
the UPAA, little authority existed for the waiver of disclosure. Some
state codes provided for waiver59 and an occasional court had im-
plied that a party waived the right to disclosure through his or her
behavior.' The language of the UPAA requiring waivers of disclo-
sure to be express and in writing offers some protection against the
sorts of implied waivers sometimes recognized by courts.
Finally, commentators have pointed to the UPAA provision lim-
iting the modification of alimony provisions in a premarital agree-
ment to only situations where modification is necessary to keep the
weaker spouse off public assistance" as a significant deviation from
the non-UPAA law of many states. 2 This provision is an exception
relies on the agreement to prove that it was entered into voluntarily, freely and
with full knowledge of its meaning and effect."); Ryken v. Ryken, 461 N.W.2d 122,
125 (S.D. 1990) ("'[An antenuptial agreement will be held valid if the prospective
spouse can be said to have had adequate knowledge of the nature and extent of
the other party's property, either as a result of disclosure by the other party or
through the independent knowledge, however acquired, of the prospective spouse,
or if the prospective spouse has been adequately provided for by the agreement.'
• . . While Husband does not dispute [this] legal principle . . . he contends this
Court should impose upon Wife in this case an obligation to find out what the
Husband owned. We decline to do so.") (citations omitted); Randolph v. Randolph,
937 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tenn. 1996) (striking down the agreement because the wife
did not have actual knowledge of the "full nature, extent and value" of the
husband's holdings); Greenwald v. Greenwald, 454 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that the wife's actual knowledge acquired by keeping the husband's
books prior to the marriage was sufficient to take the place of disclosure).
58. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a)(2)(ii), at 376.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5315(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1992). See current version at
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1610 to 1617 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151(2)(ii) (Michie
1995).
60. See, e.g., Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 569-70 (Minn. 1980) (finding
that wife's statements to husband's attorney that she knew what the agreement
was and that it was what they wanted, constituted a waiver of her right to disclo-
sure); Greenwald v. Greenwald, 454 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
agreement enforceable because evidence showed that wife wanted to marry hus-
band regardless of whether he had additional assets or not).
61. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(b), at 376.
62. See Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 840-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1984) ("An agreement which would leave a spouse a public charge or close to
it, or which would provide a standard of living far below that which was enjoyed
both before and during the marriage would probably not be enforced by any
court.") (emphasis added); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 510-11 n.ll (Ohio 1984)
(holding that "[u]nconscionability of a provision for maintenance and sustenance
contained in an antenuptial agreement may be found in a number of circumstanc-
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to the general approach to unconscionability adopted in the Act in
that it permits modification of alimony provisions that are unfair
based on circumstances at the time of enforcement rather than at the
time of execution.' However, this provision has been criticized for
placing the standard for modification so high as to make effective
policing of fairness for alimony provisions at the time of divorce all
but impossible."
III. IDAHO LAW DEALING WITH ENFORCEMENT OF
PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
A. Statutory Authority
Prior to the adoption of the UPAA in Idaho, little direct statuto-
ry authority expressly regulating premarital agreements existed in
Idaho. The Idaho Code did contain provisions dealing with "marriage
settlement agreements." These provisions did not set forth substan-
tive requirements for such agreements but, rather, established proce-
dural hurdles for them, requiring, among other things, that they be
"in writing, executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as
conveyances of land."' These provisions have been part of the Idaho
statutory law since Idaho's original adoption of a community property
system during the territorial period in 1867" and have been the
primary basis for the transmutation of community property between
the spouses. Prior to the enactment of the UPAA, which did not dis-
place these provisions of Idaho law but rather was tacked on to the
es, examples of which might be an extreme health problem requiring considerable
care and expense; change in employability of the spouse; additional burdens placed
upon a spouse by way of responsibility to children of the parties; marked changes
in the cost of providing the necessary maintenance of the spouse; and changed
circumstance of the standards of living occasioned by the marriage, where a return
to the prior living standard would work a hardship upon a spouse"); In re Mar-
riage of Purcell, 783 P.2d 1038 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (enforcing alimony award de-
spite wife's waiver in an antenuptial agreement because she had "no other rea-
sonable source of support").
63. See Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ind. 1996). Rider cites UPAA
section 6(b) and suggests that the UPAA codifies the view that antenuptial agree-
ments are enforceable unless unconscionable at the time of dissolution. Id. The
court's citation to the UPAA was dicta and appears to read section 6(b) more
broadly than the drafters intended.
64. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 7, at 147-48.
65. IDAHO CODE § 32-917 (1996). The Idaho Code also provides that such
agreements must be recorded, IDAHO CODE § 32-918 (1996), and that the effect of
recording is the same as for a land conveyance. IDAHO CODE § 32-919 (1996).
66. 1867 Idaho Territory Laws 16-18.
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end of them,"7 it was generally assumed that these provisions gov-
erned both pre- and post-marital agreements."
B. Idaho Premarital Agreement Cases
Only three Idaho cases even come close to addressing the stan-
dards to be applied to the enforcement of premarital agreements.69
In Jones v. Jones,70 the wife brought an action against the husband
to dissolve their second marriage.71 Previously, at the dissolution of
their first marriage (of twenty-two years), the wife and husband had
negotiated a separation agreement which provided, among other
things, for the equal division of their community property, custody of
the children in the wife and child support. In that separation agree-
ment, the wife also waived any rights to alimony. In anticipation of
their second marriage, the wife and husband executed a prenuptial
agreement which "ratified and confirmed the terms of the previous
separation agreement and, in addition, provided that all income
earned from the parties' separate property would be community prop-
erty and that all separate debts and property should remain sepa-
rate."72
The second marriage of the spouses in Jones lasted two years.7
The wife commenced the second divorce action; she sought $1,500 per
month alimony and alleged that all the property acquired since the
beginning of their first marriage was community property despite the
terms of the earlier separation and prenuptial agreements .7  The
wife argued that both the separation and prenuptial agreements were
procured as a result of fraud, coercion and undue influence and that
67. The older transmutation provisions are found in IDAHO CODE §§ 32-918
to -920 (1996), and the UPAA is codified as IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921 to -928 (1996).
68. Compare Wolford v. Wolford, 117 Idaho 61, 785 P.2d 625 (1991) (applying
Idaho Code sections 32-918 to -920 to a premarital agreement) with Suchan v.
Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 682 P.2d 607 (1984) and Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho
870, 643 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1982) (both applying provisions to post-marital agree-
ments). The assumption was codified in section 32-916 in 1980 when the section
was amended to apply to "agreements entered into prior to or during marriage."
IDAHO CODE § 32-916 (1980) (amended 1995). The reference to premarital agree-
ments was eliminated when the UPAA was adopted. 1995 Idaho Seas. Laws 229.
69. See Jones v. Jones, 100 Idaho 510, 601 P.2d 1 (1979); Wolford, 117 Idaho
at 61, 785 P.2d at 625; Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52 (Ct. App.
1990).
70. Jones, 100 Idaho at 510, 601 P.2d at 1.






she did not have independent advice of counsel for either agree-
ment.7
While the court did not expressly so state, it appears that the
parties engaged in some level of disclosure regarding their property
at the time of the two agreements in question because the primary
wrangling in the litigation was over whether the values of the prop-
erty were accurate."6
The court granted summary judgment against the wife without
addressing the substantive requirements necessary for a prenuptial
agreement to withstand judicial policing.77 Instead the court held
that the wife had failed to advance any evidence regarding the inac-
curacy of the property values.7" By virtue of her failure to respond to
a timely request for admissions, the wife was held to have admitted
that the values provided by the husband for their community proper-
ty represented the fair market value of the property.8 In addition,
in response to interrogatories and at deposition, the wife could pro-
vide no information as to how the values provided by the husband
were inaccurate.80 According to the court, the substance of the wife's
objection to the agreement appeared to be that her husband had
exhibited distrust of her by insisting on the agreement."1
Jones seems to indicate that disclosure of assets including valu-
ations, was apparently made by the husband to the wife at the time
the agreements were formed. As a result of the wife's discovery de-
fault, however, the case provides little guidance on the necessary
prerequisites for enforcement of a prenuptial agreement.
In Wolford v. Wolford, 2 the Idaho court again addressed the
enforceability of a prenuptial agreement. In Wolford, the husband's
attorney prepared an agreement which the husband presented to the
wife two weeks before the marriage." The husband also made ar-
rangements for the wife to consult independent counsel regarding the
75. Id.
76. Id. (noting that the husband's request for admissions were to the effect
that the "parties' agreed-to valuation" was also equal to the fair market value of
the property") (emphasis added). See also id. at 512, 601 P. 2d at 3 ("Wife has
admitted, by virtue of her failure to deny, that all the property values ascribed by
the parties to their community property were fair market values.") (emphasis add-
ed).
77. Id. at 513-14, 601 P.2d at 4-5.
78. Id. at 512, 601 P.2d at 3.
79. Id. at 512-13, 601 P.2d at 3-4.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 513, 601 P.2d at 4.
82. 117 Idaho 61, 785 P.2d 625 (1991).
83. Id. at 62, 785 P.2d at 626.
[Vol. 33554
1997] UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 555
agreement. The court also noted that "the agreement listed in a
schedule both David and Kathryn's separate property."' The agree-
ment provided that the income from the wife's salary, personal earn-
ings and separate property would remain her separate property.85 It
also provided that the salaries and earnings of the husband would be
community property but that the income or increase in value of the
husband's separate property would remain his separate property.
8 6
Because the circumstances under which the prenuptial agree-
ment in Wolford was formed were not at issue, the case provides
little guidance on the standards for enforcement. The facts of Wolford
establish, however, that the parties observed a procedure by which
the wife had independent counsel at the time of the agreement and
the agreement contained a disclosure of assets (although the nature
and extent of the disclosure is unknown). Moreover, the terms of the
agreement appear to have been favorable to the wife - allowing her
to retain her earnings and salaries as separate property and only
waiving her claim in the increase in value of the husband's separate
property.
The most recent and directly applicable Idaho case is a court of
appeals decision, Liebelt v. Liebelt.7 There the husband insisted
that the premarital agreement, drafted by his attorney, be signed
before the marriage." Although the wife was reluctant, both
spouses signed the agreement two days before the ceremony. 9 The
agreement "combined" their separate property but provided that they
would each retain a one-half undivided interest in each item of their
"combined property" as separate property.90 In addition the agree-
84. Id. at 62-63, 785 P.2d at 626-27.
85. Id. at 62, 785 P.2d at 626.
86. Id. The agreement in Wolford was not challenged as being unconsciona-
ble; nor was the adequacy of the disclosure provided at the time the agreement's
formation was challenged. Rather, the wife argued that the agreement had been
subsequently modified through an informal note written on a napkin at a bar in
which the husband allegedly promised to give the wife an interest in a corporation
that was his separate property. The court held that the attempted modification of
the prenuptial agreement was invalid because of lack of mutuality. Id. at 65, 785
P.2d at 629 The court believed that "[the napkin note] was an attempt to quiet
marital discord, rather than an attempt to transmute a multimillion dollar sepa-
rate property asset into community property." Id. In addition, the napkin note
failed to comply with the formalities for execution of a marriage settlement agree-
ment. Id. at 66, 785 P.2d 630. ("[Nleither had [Kathryn] shown that the formali-
ties required in I.C. §§ 32-917 to -919 had been followed").
87. 118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1990).
88. Id. at 846, 801 P.2d at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 846-47, 801 P.2d 53-54.
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ment provided for a distribution of this "separate combined" property
by which the parties would hire an appraiser to determine the value
of the property and would alternately select items of the property
until the value on each side was equal."
Both the magistrate and district judges held that the agreement
was unenforceable on the grounds of duress and that it was not en-
tered into freely by the wife.9" The court of appeals reversed and, for
the first time, directly addressed the prerequisites for enforcement of
prenuptial agreements. Writing for the court, Judge Walters began
the analysis by noting that "[wihen examining, or determining the
validity of, a prenuptial agreement we apply ordinary contract princi-
ples unless otherwise noted by statute or case precedent.9 3
Analyzing the duress issue, the court in Liebelt held that
[t]o be voidable on the grounds of duress, an agreement
must not only be obtained by means of pressure brought to
bear, but the agreement itself must be unconscionable, or
illegal; the defense of duress cannot be predicated on de-
mands which are lawful or the threat to do that which the
demanding party has a right to do."
The court reasoned that the husband's threat not to go through with
the marriage if an agreement was not reached was something the
husband had a legal right to do and, thus, 'could not form the basis of
a duress claim.95
With respect to undue influence, the court held that the spouse
attacking the agreement must show that she was "compelled by arti-
fice, force or fear to do, what [s]he does not want to do, and what
[sihe would not otherwise do but for such influence."" Thus, the
91. Id. at 847, 801 P.2d at 54.
92. Id. at 846, 801 P.2d at 53.
93. Id. at 847-48, 801 P.2d at 54-55 (citing Vail v. Vail, 117 Idaho 520, 789
P.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1990)). Interestingly enough, Vail did not deal with the enforce-
ability of a prenuptial agreement, but rather dealt with the interpretation of a
separation agreement that had been incorporated into a divorce decree. Moreover,
the court did not directly address the standards to be applied in interpreting the
agreement in Vail, other than to cite two non-marital contract cases as the basic
authority on the contract interpretation question at issue. Vail, 117 Idaho at 522,
789 P.2d at 210.
94. Liebelt, 118 Idaho at 848, 801 P.2d at 54 (citing Newland v. Child, 73
Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 848, 801 P.2d at 55 (citing Kelly v. Perrault, 5 Idaho 221, 48 P.
45 (1897)).
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court reasoned that undue influence had not occurred because the
husband's threat to call off the marriage did not rise to the level of
using artifice, fear or force to compel the wife to do something that
she would not otherwise do.97
Finally, the court addressed the wife's claim that she did not
understand the agreement and therefore should not be held to it.9"
Here, the court reasoned that her signature on the contract indicated
her intent to enter the contract. Relying on case law from outside
the premarital agreement context, the court concluded:
[A] written contract cannot be avoided by one of the parties to
it on the ground that he signed it without reading it and did
not understand it; failing to read the contract or to have it
read to him or to otherwise inform himself as to the nature,
terms and conditions of the contract constitutes nothing more
than gross negligence on the part of that party and is an in-
sufficient ground upon which to set the contract aside.9
Key to the court's reasoning in Liebelt was the fact that the
husband had encouraged the wife "repeatedly" to get independent ad-
vice of counsel."9 And, although she did not obtain independent
representation, the wife participated in the drafting of the agree-
ment. 1' The facts do not reveal whether disclosure of particular
assets or financial information was made at the time the agreement
was entered into. Finally, the agreement appeared, on its face, to
have been fair to the wife. In fact, the court's opinion does not make
clear what the wife stood to gain by contesting the agreement; it did
not waive alimony claims and it effectuated a relatively even division
of property that otherwise would have been separate property."9
Liebelt's reasoning that premarital contracts are governed by the
same standards that govern non-marital contracts between third par-
ties, is problematic'03 in that it ignores the special status of the
marital relationship."' Moreover, the court was selectively blind in
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 848-49, 801 P.2d at 55-56 (citing Milner v. Earl Fruit Co. of the
Northwest, 40 Idaho 339, 345-46, 232 P. 581, 583 (1925); Grant Lumber Co. v.
North River Ins. Co. of N.Y., 253 F. 83 (D. Idaho 1918)).
100. Id. at 849, 801 P.2d at 56.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Becker also impliedly criticizes Leibelt for applying a traditional contract
approach to duress rather than recognizing duress as a more general component of
voluntariness. Becker, supra note 34, at 9-10.
104. Judith Younger has identified several reasons why premarital agreements
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its survey of non-marital contract law in that it completely ignored
the possibility that the parties to a premarital agreement are in a
confidential relationship. Such a relationship between parties to a
premarital agreement has been recognized by virtually every other
court that has addressed these cases.1" The Idaho courts have con-
sistently recognized a definition of confidential relationship outside
the domestic relations context, broad enough to include the relation-
ship between two people contemplating marriage.1"
differ from other contracts. First, the subject matter of premarital agreements,
marital property and spousal support, rights and obligations of the spouses during
marriage, and the rearing and care of children, is of greater interest to the state
than is the subject matter of the typical commercial contract. Second, the parties
to a premarital agreement are most often involved in a confidential relationship in
which their bargaining power is seldom equal. Finally, premarital agreements gen-
erally are performed some time in the future of a relationship that has not yet
begun and which may continue for many years before the agreement is executed.
Younger, Update, supra note 25, at 3-4. See Atwood, supra note 7, at 131-33 for
a detailed discussion and elaboration of Younger's reasoning.
105. The existence of a confidential relationship has been recognized most
often as the basis for much of the special protection accorded to premarital agree-
ments. In his hornbook on domestic relations law, Homer Clark states that
"[Many courts take the view that the prospective spouses are in a confidential
relationship, and this seems clearly correct." 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.9, at 44 (2d ed. 1987). See also
Atwood, supra note 7, at 133; Younger, Update, supra note 25, at 18-19 (stating
that "[aiccording to most courts, parties to antenuptial agreements do not deal at
arm's length; rather they are in confidential relationships that call for good faith,
candor and sincerity in all matters connected with the agreement"). For recent
cases recognizing the confidential relationship between prospective spouses, see
Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994) ("The mutual trust between
the parties raises an expectation that each party will act in the other's best inter-
est . . . . Parties to premarital agreements therefore are held to the highest de-
gree of good faith, honest, and. candor in connection with the negotiation and exe-
cution of such agreements."); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 449 S.E.2d 502, 504 (Va. Ct.
App. 1994) ("Parties engaged to be married are not dealing at arm's length. They
have a special relationship of trust and confidence.").
106. In Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 706 P.2d 1348 (Ct. App. 1985), the
Idaho Court of Appeals set forth the requirements for a confidential relationship in
Idaho. Klein involved a situation in which the transferors deeded land to the
transferees in an exchange for an oral contract to reconvey the land at a later
date. Id. at 239, 706 P.2d at 1350. The parties had a long-term friendship in
which the transferee had also served as insurance agent and personal financial
advisor to the transferors. Id. at 238, 706 P.2d at 1349. The case turned on the
question of whether a confidential relationship arose between the parties such that
the transferees had a duty to deal fairly with the transferors. Id. at 239, 706 P.2d
at 1350. Relying, in part, on the Restatement of Restitution, the court reasoned
that a confidential relationship exists "wherever by reason of kinship, business
association, disparity of age, etc., the transferee is in an especially close relation-
ship to the transferor, and the latter reposes a high degree of trust and confidence
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Idaho case law regarding contracts between persons in a confi-
dential relationship provides significant support for a more protective
approach to a premarital agreement than that applied by the Liebelt
court. The Idaho courts have held that the existence of a confidential
relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to disclose information
to the other party and to act fairly toward that party.1" Finally, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized a broad approach to the doc-
trine of unconscionability in commercial contracts that permits such
contracts to be challenged for procedural irregularities in the forma-
tion of the contract short of duress or fraud.108
in the former." Id. at 240, 706 P.2d at 1351 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION § 166, cmt. d (1937)). See also, Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d
698 (1966) (finding a confidential relationship between homeowners and their build-
ing contractor); Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d 833, 840-41
(1952) ("A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation cre-
ated by or defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been a special
confidence imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act
in good faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing the confidence.").
107. In Bethlahmy, 91 Idaho at 55, 415 P.2d at 698, the court found that the
existence of a confidential relationship between homeowners and the builder of
their home, imposed upon the builder a duty to disclose the fact that an unsealed
irrigation ditch ran under the garage of the home. In reaching this conclusion, the
Bethlahmy court relied on the Second Restatement of Torts which provides:
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 551(2) (1976) (quoted in Bethlahmy, 91 Idaho at
59, 415 P.2d at 702). See also Stearns, 72 Idaho at 287-88, 240 P.2d at 840-41.
108. In Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1986), the
Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the requirement for unconscionability in a com-
mercial contract. Writing for the court, Judge Burnett reasoned that an agreement
could be either procedurally or substantively unconscionable. According to the
court, "[pirocedural unconscionability relates to the bargaining process leading to
an agreement. It is characterized by disparity in the bargaining positions of the
parties, by extreme need of one party to reach some agreement (however unfavor-
able), or by threats short of duress." Id. at 493-94, 725 P.2d at 198-99. Substantive
unconscionability relates to the agreement itself. According to Judge Burnett, sub-
stantive unconscionability could be shown only in special circumstances where
'at the time of making of the contract, and in light of the general
commercial background and commercial needs of a particular case,
clauses are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise one of
the parties.' The elements of one-sidedness, oppression and unfair
surprise are commonly cited in analysis of unconscionability.
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C. Idaho Post-Marital Agreement Cases
In addition to these premarital contract cases, the Idaho courts
have addressed the enforceability of marriage settlement agreements
negotiated by spouses in the shadow of divorce and have taken a very
protective approach to these agreements.
In Compton v. Compton,"° the Idaho Supreme Court set forth
the requirements for attacking the enforceability of a marriage settle-
ment agreement negotiated in contemplation of divorce. The action in
Compton arose in the context of an independent action for relief from
a final judgment of divorce, into which the parties' property settle-
ment agreement had been merged. The court held that an "extreme
degree of fraud" must be shown to support an independent action
attacking a prior judgment.11 ° Regarding the property settlement
agreement, the court held that the husband and wife were involved
in a fiduciary relationship until such time as their marriage was dis-
solved.' This fiduciary relationship, is not altered because the par-
ties are negotiating in contemplation of divorce. As the court ex-
plained:
This fiduciary duty extends to the parties' negotiations leading
to formation of the property settlement agreement during
marriage, and requires, at least, a disclosure by both parties
of all information within their knowledge regarding the exis-
tence of community property and of pertinent facts necessary
to arrive at a reasonable valuation of the property."2
In characterizing an earlier decision, the court reasoned:
In Sande v. Sande, the court held that where a separation
agreement is unfair and inequitable, and where overreaching
appears, the agreement may be avoided despite the absence of
actual fraud and duress. That is, the presence of overreaching
automatically shifts the burden to the party benefitted by the
unequal agreement to show that the community should not be
reapportioned. Overreaching often appears where one of the
parties is not represented by independent counsel." 3
Id. (quoting Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976)).
109. 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980).
110. Id. at 335, 612 P.2d at 1182.
111. Id. at 336, 612 P.2d at 1183.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
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In Compton, the wife alleged that the husband had misrepre-
sented the value of the community property."" On its review of the
record, however, the court found that the wife's allegations that she
was unaware of the property values or that she did not suspect the
values provided by the husband were not supported."' Rather the
court concluded that the husband had made adequate disclosure of
the existence of the property and of the fact that its value had appre-
ciated even though there was significant room to argue that the hus-
band had undervalued the property. Thus, the court held that the
wife's allegations did not, as a matter of law, rise to the level neces-
sary to show the extreme degree of fraud necessary to set aside a
judgment."' Importantly, the court refused to consider whether the
husband's disclosures would have been sufficient had the court been
considering the question in a direct appeal from the divorce ac-
tion."7
In Golder v. Golder,"' the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
trial court decision to set aside the final judgment of divorce which
incorporated a property settlement agreement reached as a result of
fraud and overreaching of the husband. In Golder the husband made
false representations to the wife regarding the value and extent of
their community property. He told her that they were on the verge of
bankruptcy which was not true. He represented her fair share of the
community at a level significantly lower than its true value. As a
result of his representations, the wife signed a property settlement
agreement that provided her a community property distribution of
approximately $11,000 when the actual value of their community
estate was more than $355,000."9 The court, affirming Compton's
characterization of the marriage as giving rise to a fiduciary relation,
held that the husband concealed the values of the community proper-
ty and overreached the wife who was not represented by counsel as
part of the negotiations.' 20
114. Id. at 332, 612 P.2d at 1179.
115. Id. at 336-37, 612 P.2d at 1183-84.
116. Id. at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181.
117. Id. at 337, 612 P.2d at 1184 ("We expressly decline to decide whether we
would agree with the husband's valuation if this matter were before the court on
appeal from the divorce decree."). See also Bodine v. Bodine, 114 Idaho 163, 165,
754 P.2d 1200, 1202 (1988) ("The failure of a spouse to make such disclosures may
be grounds for setting aside a judgment that divides the community inequitably.").
118. 110 Idaho 57, 714 P.2d 26 (1986).
119. Id. at 60, 714 P.2d at 29.
120. Id. at 61, 714 P.2d at 30.
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Since Compton, it has been clear in Idaho that parties to a mar-
riage are in a fiduciary relationship that imposes on them a duty to
deal fairly with each other. That duty includes a duty to disclose the
existence of community property and the necessary information to
enable a party to arrive at their own valuation of that property.
Where an agreement effectuates an unfair division of the property,
the burden is on the person who benefits from the agreement to show
that it was fairly obtained. Furthermore, the Idaho courts have
viewed the lack of independent advice of counsel for the economically
subservient spouse as serious evidence of overreaching.12'
The Idaho post-marital agreement cases provide a startling con-
trast to the premarital agreement cases. The courts' willingness to
recognize a very protective standard even in the context of an antici-
pated divorce differs sharply from the courts' freedom of contract
approach to premarital cases of treating the prospective spouses just
like your average commercial parties. Also interesting is the fact that
the courts in both Wolford and Liebelt never referred to Compton and
its progeny.
IV. THE UPAA AND IDAHO LAw: ANALYSIS AND ADVICE
A. General Observations
Because the Idaho law dealing with premarital agreements is so
spotty, the adoption of the UPAA fills some important gaps. The Act
provides a standard for unconscionability and sets forth the circum-
stances under which disclosure must take place - neither of which
had been previously addressed by Idaho courts. To the extent that
the Idaho courts had held in Liebelt that a premarital agreement is
subject to the same standards for enforceability as are commercial
contracts, the UPAA provides a more protective standard for the
enforcement of premarital contracts. Despite the criticism of the Act
for adopting a lower standard for unconscionability than that devel-
oping in the states at the time of its drafting, its requirement of
voluntary execution clearly retains many procedural protections
above and beyond what would normally be required in a commercial
context.
The most troubling aspect of the UPAA for Idaho is the radically
different standard it establishes for court supervision in the premari-
121. In both Compton and Golder the respective wives were unrepresented.
See Compton, 101 Idaho at 336, 612 P.2d at 1183 ("Overreaching often appears
when one of the parties is not represented by independent counsel."); Golder, 110
Idaho at 60-61, 714 P.2d at 29-30.
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tal agreement context compared to the requirements in the post-mar-
ital agreement context under Idaho case law. The adoption of the Act
does not resolve the startling contrast that had existed in the Idaho
cases between these two situations. The UPAA permits disclosure to
be expressly waived, and dispenses with the disclosure requirement
when the future spouse knew or could have know of the other
person's financial situation. Compton and its progeny make clear that
the "knew or could have known" standard does not apply to the post-
marital contract situation even when the spouses are bargaining in
the shadow of divorce. The explanation offered by the court in
Compton - the fiduciary duty imposed on the manager spouse in a
community property state - does not seem to fully justify the dis-
tinction between the cases given the fact that prospective spouses are
generally considered to be in a confidential relationship.
This more protective approach to post-marital agreements can-
not be easily explained from a policy perspective. The substance of
pre- and post-marital agreements between spouses is likely to be
similar. If anything the argument is for stronger procedural
protections in the context of the premarital agreement than the post-
marital agreement. First, the parties' relationship of trust and confi-
dence is arguably at its strongest immediately before the wedding
when the couple is likely to envision a rosey future going on indefi-
nitely for themselves. In the Compton fact pattern, the relationship
had deteriorated to the point where the parties were contemplating
divorce most likely because their faith and trust in each other had
broken down.
In addition to the different nature of the relationship of trust
and confidence, a person who is not yet married will usually be in a
weaker position to know of the other person's financial affairs than a
person who is married will be. The married person has been presum-
ably residing in the same home with his or her spouse, and has likely
been required to sign financial documents and other instruments
such as tax returns during the marriage which could have made him
or her privy to details of financial information. Even unmarried per-
sons who have cohabited will not experience the same level of
entwinement on financial affairs.
Thus, the adoption of the UPAA in Idaho sets up a situation in
which the unmarried person entering into a prenuptial agreement
will receive significantly less protection than the married person
entering into a marriage settlement agreement will receive.
This anomaly can be avoided if the Idaho courts apply the UPAA
standards rigorously. Rigorous application will be most important in
two areas. First, the courts must fully and rigorously apply the re-
quirement of voluntariness in the Act to protect the economically un-
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empowered spouse from overreaching and sharp tactics by the em-
powered spouse. Second, courts must be vigilant against expanding
the "knew of could have known" exception to the disclosure require-
ment beyond the bounds necessary to protect the economically un-
empowered person in a premarital agreement context. In this regard,
the court should ask whether the un-empowered spouse's knowledge
is comparable in depth and detail to what they would have received
had the other spouse formally engaged in adequate disclosure.
B. Advice to the Wise
Lawyers advising clients regarding a premarital agreement
should carefully follow a number of steps to best ensure the enforce-
ability of the agreement in the future. It may be that the following
advice should be obvious. Judging, however, by the number of cases
in which no disclosure took place, and in which both parties were not
represented and sharp tactics were apparently present, it bears re-
peating."
First, the lawyer should impress upon the client the importance
of negotiating and executing the agreement well before the antici-
pated wedding date. Second, the lawyer should ensure that both
prospective spouses are represented by counsel. Clients often wish to
avoid the expense associated with the latter suggestion; the prudent
lawyer, however, should insist on the presence of independent repre-
sentation. Although the UPAA does not require independent repre-
sentation, the UPAA's requirement of voluntariness should protect
the economically un-empowered spouse against overreaching and
sharp tactics; it is crucial to avoid even the appearance of inappropri-
ateness in the execution of the agreement.
Despite the fact that the UPAA does not require disclosure un-
der all circumstances, detailed disclosure is the best way to protect
against a future attack on the basis of unconscionability. Disclosure
122. A number of guides for drafting premarital agreements are available.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER LINLEY & LOUIS PARLEY, LINLEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS (1994); DAVID SALTMAN & HARRY SCHAFFNER, DON'T
GET MARRIED UNTIL YOU READ THIS: A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO PRENUPTIAL AGREE-
MENTS, (1989); GARY SKOLOFF, ET AL., DRAFTING PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS (1994);
LESTER WALLMAN & SHARON MCDONNELL, CUPIDS, COUPLES, AND CONTRACTS: A
GUIDE TO LIVING TOGETHER, PRENUTIAL AGREEMENTS AND DIVORCE (1994); Edward
L. Winer, Practical Considerations for Premarital Agreements in PREMARITAL CON-
TRACTS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING ENFORCEABLE MARITAL
AND COHABITATION AGREEMENTS (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker eds., 1993).
For a feminist critique of these and other guides, see Guggenheimer, supra note
16 at 160-87.
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should include financial statements, tax returns or data, and other
information regarding the property owned by each spouse, its value
and each spouse's respective incomes." The documents constituting
disclosure should be provided to the other party enough in advance of
execution to allow the party to study and analyze them. The docu-
ments evidencing the parties' property, its value and their incomes
should be attached to and made part of the agreement. Reciting that
disclosure has taken place in the agreement is not enough if, in fact,
no disclosure took place. 2' Finally, care should be taken to ensure
that disclosure is complete and accurate. Incomplete or inaccurate
disclosure will provide fodder for subsequent litigation and may, if
the omissions are serious enough, lead to the invalidity of the agree-
ment.
The express waiver of disclosure provision of the UPAA provides
a tempting out for the client who is reluctant to make detailed dis-
closure of his or her property and financial information. However, the
waiver of disclosure must itself be voluntary.' 25 Thus, to the extent
that the agreement as a whole has problems with the voluntariness
requirement, an. express waiver contained in the agreement would
also be in jeopardy. In addition, to the extent a party does not fully
understand his or her right to disclosure, a waiver might have sepa-
rate voluntariness problems. If an express waiver is to be used, it
should be executed as a separate agreement for which the waiving
spouse has independent advice of counsel.
Finally, with respect to disclosure, relying on the spouses' gener-
al knowledge of each other's financial situation is not advisable. At a
minimum, if the agreement is ever attacked, thorny litigation over
what the spouse actually knew is likely. Moreover, the failure to
make disclosure or obtain an express, voluntary waiver of disclosure,
can, in the presence of other facts, give rise to the appearance of
sharp tactics or overreaching.
123. The UPAA section 6(a)(2) requires disclosure of "property or financial
obligations" of the parties. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a)(2), at 376. Section 1(2) of
the UPAA defines property as "an interest . . in real or personal property, in-
cluding income and earnings." UPAA, supra note 1, § 1(2), at 371.
124. Younger, Update, supra note 25, at 25-26.
125. UPAA, supra note 1, § 6(a)(2)(iii), at 376.
